Massive public pressure is arising to achieve data privacy and protection. One way to maintain data privacy is to perform efficient data disposal processes. This minimizes the chances of data leakage over an extended period and through irresponsible actions. That is why adequate data disposal is essential in so many governmental and critical institutions. Simply " deleting " data does not erase it. In fact, it only removes the name that refers to that piece of data, but the data itself remains. In this paper, we utilize an encryption algorithm and then perform a ran-domization process to dispose of data values in an irreversible approach making it difficult to retrieve the original value of data from the defaced result.
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USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies
We present algorithms and an architecture for the secure deletion of individual versions of a Þle. The principal application of this technology is federally compliant stor- age; it is designed to eliminate data after a mandatory re- tention period. However, it applies to any storage system that shares data between Þles, most notably versioning Þle systems. We compare two methods
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USENIX Security Symposium
Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for several sec- onds after power is lost, even at room temperature and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of us- able
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Journal of Information Science and Engineering
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Modern systems keep long memories. As we show in this paper, an adversary who gains access to a Linux system, even one that implements secure deallocation, can recover the contents of applications' windows, audio buffers, and data remaining in device drivers-long after the applications have terminated. We design and implement Lacuna, a system that allows users to run programs in "private sessions." After the session is over, all memories of its execution are erased. The key abstraction in Lacuna is an ephemeral channel, which allows the protected program to talk to peripheral devices while making it possible to delete the memories of this communication from the host. Lacuna can run unmodified applications that use graphics, sound, USB input devices, and the network, with only 20 percentage points of additional CPU utilization.
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Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing - SAC '08
